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In this latest addition to the Re-reading the Canon series (a series of 
collections each devoted to feminist interpretations of a single philosopher), 
we are offered thirteen essays on Hume's philosophy, covering his views on 
metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, religion, aesthetics politics, 
and history. They address all of his main works and many of his less discussed 
essays. This diverse collection is bound together by the theme of feminism, 
but how this theme works itself in varies considerably from essay to essay. 
There are, broadly, four different ways that feminism enters into the inter-
pretations. 
First, there are essays which show how current feminist theory can benefit 
from some Humean insights; they argue that if we read (or re-read) Hume 
in a particular way, we can address concerns or problems that feminist 
theorists face. Christine Swanton's 'Compassion as a virtue in Hume' is an 
example of this kind offeminist reading. Swanton looks carefully at Hume's 
discussion of compassion, sympathy and benevolence, and convincingly ar-
gues that his view has much in common with an ethics of care and can help 
diffuse the objection that such an ethics is overly demanding, causing 
individuals to be lost in the pain of others. 
Second, there are essays which show how feminist theory can help Hume; 
they argue that he could escape some of his contradictions ifhe were to adopt 
some insights from feminist theory. This view is expressed, for example, in 
Jennifer A. Herdt's 'Superstition and the Timid Sex', the only essay on 
religion. Herdt offers a novel and well-argued interpretation, suggesting that 
in Hume's comment that the 'weak and timid sex is responsible for leading 
men into superstition', we can find the seeds of a feminist analysis and 
critique of the ways in which religion reinforces the socialization of women 
into prescribed sex roles (283). Hume's thought is in tension on this matter; 
he thought the socialization both necessary and dangerous, but, if we focus 
only on what he says about the danger, Herdt shows how a feminist critique 
can be gleaned from his writings. 
Third, there are those essays that focus on the misogynistic aspects of 
Hume's philosophy, pointing out the limits of any feminist-friendly reading 
of Hume. These are the least interesting type and do not offer much of 
philosophical value. For example in 'The Metaphorics of Hume's Gendered 
Scepticism', Aaron A. Smuts argues that, for Hume, imagination and nature 
are both feminine. They seduce and deceive the male philosopher so that he 
cannot help but maintain beliefs that lack any rational foundation. The 
notion that, for Hume, nature is a 'bad woman' does not seem consistent with 
all the gratefulness he has for nature saving him from his skeptical moods. 
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Last, there are a number of essays which recognize concerns that are 
common to both Hume and feminists, and argue that Hume is a philosopher 
whose views are of particular importance to feminist thought. Many of the 
strongest essays are of this type. For example the first three essays, which 
are all concerned with Book One of the Treatise, argue that Hume's view of 
knowledge, reason and his conception of philosophy should be of particular 
interest to feminist philosophers. In 'Hume: The Reflective Women's 
Epistemologist?', Annette Baier points out that Hume recognizes, as do many 
feminists, that 'norms -'-- including norms for knowledge acquisition - are 
social in their genesis as well as in their intended scope' (30). Hume's 
epistemology, she says, is 'fallibilist and cooperative' (31). In 'Hume on the 
Passion of Truth', Genevieve Lloyd explores Hume's version of the 'whole-
ness' of mind, where passions, imagination and intellect are unified instead 
of polarized as they are in more traditional masculine philosophy. In 'Recon-
ceptualizing Reasoning and Writing the Philosophical Canon: The Case of 
David Hume', Anne Jaap Jacobson argues that, like many feminist philoso-
phers, Hume questions the traditional ideal of philosophy which strives to 
conceive of concepts in a purely rational manner. 
A number of the conclusions of these three essays are correct. Hume does 
think both passions and reason are essential components of humans; reason 
does not get exalted as it does among many (though not all) of Hume's 
predecessors. But we also find overstatements and overemphases in these 
essays. For example, Jacobson is right that Hume questioned the .value of 
trying to find final answers to philosophical questions, but when she claims 
that Hume 'explicitly rejects the goal of arriving at consistent answers to the 
questions addressed' (61), she goes too far. Even though Hume does not claim 
his way of solving a problem is the last word on the matter, he did hope that 
his theories 'might stand the test of the most critical examination' (Treatise 
I.iv.7.14). So he still aimed for consistency and harmony in his philosophical 
theories. 
Two of the most interesting essays are on Hume's moral philosophy, but 
in each feminism seems to enter in as an after-thought; one can imagine 
them standing on their own with the feminist parts subtracted. Joyce L. 
Jenkins and Rob Shaver's 'Mr. Hobbes Could Have Said No More' is a 
well-argued piece focusing on a troubling passage in Hume's second Enquiry 
where he says that, if there were a species of creatures intermingled with 
men who were greatly inferior in both mind and body, 'we should be bound 
by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures', but should 
not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to 
them. 
Jenkins and Shaver suggest that Hume's recommendation of humanity 
over justice is justified on broadly utilitarian grounds, that humanity would 
better serve the inferior party. The necessarily general and inflexible nature 
of justice could stand in the way of what would best serve these people. The 
superior could help the inferior more, they argue, if they could make use of 
the flexibility of humanity. It is hard to see what is the feminist part of this 
126 
interpretation. It comes in the second section which suggests that with a few 
insights from Mill, Hume need not see women as inferior creatures. 
Jacqueline Taylor's 'Hume and the Reality ofValue' is a careful discussion 
about Hume's metaethics, and rightfully criticizes those who view Hume as 
a non-cognitivist, pointing out that Hume's view is much more complex and 
more integrative, with moral features and sentiments as reciprocal and 
mutually guiding concepts (116). But it is unclear what work feminism is 
doing in Taylor's piece. Christopher Williams' 'False Delicacy', which focuses 
on Hume's essay 'Of the Standard of Taste', is an insightful discussion of 
aesthetic appreciation where again the feminism seems inessential. 
What is best in this collection is that it focuses attention on some of the 
often neglected aspects of Hume's philosophy. Given that feminists are 
concerned with exposing and investigating what is overlooked, this uncover-
ing may be what is most centrally feminist about the book. It also succeeds, 
as Jacobson urges in her introduction, in encouraging readers to ask more 
questions, to continue the discussion and to find new and creative ways of 
reading Hume. 
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